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Abstract: This article brings forward a set of examples from the 
“Swedological” literature that had its golden era circa 1930–1980 – i.e. 
non-Swedish interpretations of Swedish society (or features of it), 
done in order to fight ideological wars on non-Swedish soil, using 
Sweden as a case in point. The theme of Sweden as a peaceful nation, 
both in its internal developments and in its role in the world, was a 
crucial feature of the genre from the outset. It has been possible to 
interpret Sweden’s neutrality policies (including heavy production and 
exports of arms) in different ways. This has also been the case with 
Swedish attempts to take responsibility in the world, showing global 
conscience (e.g. through criticism against international bullies or 
through foreign aid). The theme of peaceableness has, over the decades, 
been a tool in fights between “Swedophiles” and “Swedoclasts”, both 
sides applying a certain “logic of debunkery” in their mutual attempts 
to disclose the opposite camp’s depictions as myths.
Peaceful Sweden and the war  
of “Swedophiles” and “Swedoclasts”1
Sweden used to be known as one of those poor European countries, 
abandoned by big chunks of their populations for a better life across 
 1 The main contents of this article were originally presented at a conference ar-
ranged by The Nobel Museum and Södertörn University, “Cosmopolitanism in 
a Wider Context: Conceptualizing Past and Present”, Stockholm, 24–26.11.2011. 
I have benefited from discussing its theme with students at the University of 
Michigan in 2004, 2011 and 2018, as well as with students at Vilnius University’s 
Centre for Scandinavian Studies – where I have had the privilege to be a recur-
ring guest lecturer in its vibrant milieu, imbued with the generous spirit of Ērika 
Sausverde.
Shaping the Rings of the Scandinavian Fellowship. Festschrift in Honour of Ērika 
Sausverde. Edited by Ieva Steponavičiūtė Aleksiejūnienė and Loreta Vaicekauskienė. 
(Scandinavistica Vilnensis 14). Vilnius University Press, 2019.
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the Atlantic. Nothing of interest. But with a foretaste in a theme issue 
of the National Geographic in 1928, and a breakthrough in the press cov-
erage from the Stockholm Exhibition of Arts and Crafts in 1930, Sweden 
suddenly became all the rage in the USA. “Smorgasbord” became a cu-
linary fashion (and one of the few Swedish loan words in English). In 
discussions related to the Depression and the early New Deal, some 
depicted the country as a Utopia, rhyming “Sweden” with “the Garden 
of Eden”. As an argument in support of the “second” New Deal, the 
journalist Marquis Childs published a counter-image in his political 
bestseller Sweden: The Middle Way in 1936. He claimed that Sweden 
had become the world’s only really working laissez-faire economy, due 
to forces counteracting capitalism’s self-destructive tendency towards 
monopoly. The main example, and central theme of the book, was the 
consumers’ co-op movement. Childs saw parallel balancing influences 
in other popular movements as well, especially the trade unions. A con-
structive role was also assigned to the state, as Conservative, Liberal 
and Social Democratic governments, showing strong continuity over 
several decades, had intervened in production, only marginally, but in 
a way that created competition, rather than quenching it. Sweden was 
anything but a Utopia. On the contrary, the virtue of “the Swede” was 
his practicality: his focus on solving problems in a reasonable way, by 
means of earthbound dialogue between all interests concerned. Thus, 
in Childs’s take, the little kingdom illustrated the possibility of combin-
ing true democracy with economic efficiency, even to turn grass-roots 
action into a crucial lever of wealth creation (Östlund, 2014).
Childs’s The Middle Way would become the major classic of an in-
ternational genre. In the late 1960s another American, David Jenkins – 
one of its most astute contributors – dubbed it “Swedological writings” 
( Jenkins, 1968, 17). The texts within this multifaceted genre were writ-
ten by non-Swedes and used Sweden as a case in point within debates in 
other countries. Her case was used to wage ideological wars on foreign 
soil. But the points made in depicting and analysing various aspects of 
Swedish society differed in an astounding and instructively erratic way. 
Often it became obvious that the truth about Sweden as such was of mar-
ginal interest (if of any interest at all). The main question was in what 
ways was it possible to deploy the Swedish case, always relating new 
statements to clusters of claims already in place. The genre would thus 
be formed by “Swedophiles”, using different aspects of Swedish life, or 
Swedish society in general, as a model to follow, and by “Swedoclasts”, 
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who were just as eager to single out Sweden, or things Swedish, as a de-
terrent, as a road leading astray. Even writers who attempted to be neutral 
and balanced – such as Jenkins – had to realize they had entered an ide-
ological battlefield, finding their way in the line of fire between partisans 
on both sides, all claiming to debunk myths created by the other side.
The golden era of Swedology would roughly span the five decades from 
1930 to 1980. By all measures, the external attention attracted by the coun-
try during those years was disproportionate to its size and importance. 
The motor behind it all was very obvious: the economic Cinderella story 
of the nation. Her success was visibly founded on industrial and tech-
nological prowess. This was mirrored in the fact that Swedophiles and 
Swedoclasts all agreed on one basic condition of the debate: Sweden 
was perceived as the land of far-reaching industrial modernity. Most 
Swedologists tacitly agreed on treating the Swedish case as a crystal ball: 
in il paese del futuro (“the land of the future”, Altavilla, 1967), it was pos-
sible to discern futures for other countries on track towards economic, 
social, political and cultural modernity – rosy or thorny futures, oppor-
tunities or risks. In the years around 1970 Sweden was the second-richest 
country in the world. Even the angriest Swedoclasts could not, in those 
years, avoid admitting that the Swedes actually were the richest people 
in the world, as Sweden – in stark contrast to the USA, which had the 
world’s highest GNP – had practically eradicated poverty, allowing all 
citizens to enjoy the wealth of the nation. Thus, it became crucial to 
Swedoclasts of this generation – a choir reaching a crescendo – to turn 
Swedish material progress and obsession with efficiency into a vice. 
Making a case for economic failure was hardly an option. This soon 
changed. After the international economic crisis had finally reached the 
country in earnest, around 1976, Sweden turned into just another ad-
vanced industrial nation, having its ups and downs. Then the external 
attention dwindled rapidly. But the traditions of Swedology lingered. 
Patterns from the golden era of the genre were occasionally reactivated 
after 1980. One such case was when shocking “facts” about eugenic steri-
lization policies in the Welfare State between 1935 and 1975 suddenly be-
came topical in media around the world in 1997 (Broberg & Tydén, 1998).
In the decades since 1980, patterns of Swedological writings have 
increasingly been applied to the Scandinavian or Nordic countries in 
general – often putting the happy Danes, the rich Norwegians or the 
well-educated Finns in the front seat. Such efforts to turn Scandinavia in 
general into a “model” to follow have not necessarily referred to Sweden 
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in particular, as they pretty much always did before 1980. This trend has 
possibly been reversed a bit in recent years, since issues of immigra-
tion and cultural diversity have become the centrepiece in a new wave 
of Swedoclasm, with critics like Donald Trump bringing Sweden back 
into the focus of attention (Rapacioli, 2018). The theme of this debate is 
quite foreign to the writings of the Swedological genre’s golden age, de-
spite its dependence on inherited patterns. Interwar and early postwar 
contributions did often count cultural and “racial” homogeneity among 
the explanatory factors behind supposedly unique features of Swedish 
society. Only in the decade around 1970 did Sweden’s assumed cultural 
conformism and traditionally harsh treatment of its ethnic minorities 
turn up in Swedoclastic arguments, and Sweden’s increasingly non-as-
similationist stance towards immigrants (e.g. offering home language 
classes in the school system) in Swedophile depictions. When such is-
sues did turn up, they were closely related to the feature in Swedological 
writings that is the topic of this essay: the theme of peaceable Sweden.
Readers of Swedological writings from the 1930s through the 1970s 
would see the basic story repeated ad nauseam – and extended in time, 
decade after decade. Sweden had not been at war since 1814 – a record 
beating even Switzerland by some decades. The puzzlingly peaceful di-
vorce with Norway in 1905 had been one of the events that had attracted 
global attention to Scandinavia before the 1930s. Since the early nine-
teenth century, Sweden had been neutral, more or less consistently ap-
plying the principle of non-alignment in peacetime, aiming at neutrality 
in times of war. But in contrast to Switzerland, her neutrality policies 
did not exclude an active role on the global scene. The two European 
nations with confusingly similar names soon took on roles as peace me-
diators. Sometimes they did so together, and often in a hands-on fash-
ion. An example of this was their shared responsibilities as protectors 
of the demilitarized zone between the two Korean states after 1953 – a 
still ongoing assignment. But the Korean War had actually been one of 
Sweden’s aberrations from strict neutrality. She had been a partisan in 
the camp officially fighting in the United Nations’ name, although she 
never contributed armed troops (only a field hospital and similar forms 
of assistance). This was consistent with a well-established stance. A rel-
atively strong and consistent support for the League of Nations in com-
parison with many countries during the interwar years (we will soon see 
some testimonies to this) was followed up with becoming one of the 
UN’s most devoted founding members after 1945. Swedish soldiers in 
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blue berets on peacekeeping missions would soon be a common sight 
in conflict zones all over the globe. Dag Hammarskjöld’s achievement as 
perhaps the strongest secretary general in the UN’s history (1953–1961) 
would become a symbol of the organization’s potential. After his dra-
matic death during the Congo Crisis in 1961, the Norwegian parliament’s 
Nobel committee awarded him the peace prize posthumously – a rare 
exception. Sweden had already received three such prices, and in 1982 
Alva Myrdal would bring home another one for her work against the nu-
clear arms race – a mission linked to that of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), founded in 1966.
One factor would seriously complicate the general image of Sweden as 
the land of peace. Few Swedologists neglected to point it out and many 
tried to interpret it. A central phenomenon within the basic reason for 
paying attention to Sweden in the first place – her industrial success – was 
linked to her neutrality policy, namely her proportionally large production 
and export of military goods. Sweden is still today one of the world’s larg-
est arms exporters in relation to her population size. Particularly during 
the Cold War, the “Swedish hedgehog” claimed to secure its independ-
ence by making its own machine guns, cannons, bandwagons and fighter 
aircraft – needing an international market for the policy’s economic buoy-
ancy, and creating well-paid, high-tech industrial jobs as well as profits for 
capitalist investors at the same time. On the other hand, there were always 
speculations about how intimate Sweden’s relationship with the Western 
bloc really was, since postwar visions of forming a “neutral pact” with her 
Nordic neighbours had crashed, and Norway and Denmark had joined 
NATO in 1949. Like almost every Swede, most Swedologists assumed the 
relationship to be closer behind the scenes than it was in public. But few 
would have expected it to have been as elaborate as it actually was shown 
to have been in investigations carried out after the Cold War – an era when 
Sweden would gradually become a more loyal partner within the NATO 
community than many of its formal members (Petersson, 2018). After the 
Cold War it also became a less complex option, trying to combine formal 
neutrality with membership in the European Union (Sweden joined in 
1995). During the second half of the golden age of Swedology, security 
policy issues had been a major reason for Sweden to (mainly) keep its 
distance from the EU’s formation process.
Sweden’s security policies and place in the world were seldom the 
major issue in Swedological writings. But it was a fairly constant and visi-
ble feature within the genre. It was linked to other features in intimate but 
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complex ways. In creative manners, Swedologists used the theme as one 
of the bludgeons at hand, fighting the opposite camp in the continuous 
combat between Swedophiles and Swedoclasts. It will not be possible to 
carry out a complete survey of how it was done in this article. The am-
bition is rather to make a probe into the Swedological activities during 
the genre’s golden era, making some observations that may be useful in 
future examinations of this curious and elusive historical phenomenon.
The middle way: champion  
of peace or Hitler’s fifth column?
A land of negotiating problem solvers and labour peace
The first Swedological full-length book, attempting to turn the kingdom 
of the Bernadottes into a case in point, an example carrying a message 
to the world, was probably Agnes Rothery’s Sweden: The Land and its 
People, published in New York in 1934. Soon in her portrait, Sweden’s 
peaceful history came into focus. Rothery claimed that the country was 
both old and new, showing the wisdom of age and the vitality of youth:
Unravaged by wars for over a hundred years its men have had 
a chance to attain their full bodily stature; its laws have had a chance 
to become rational. The money which other nations have blown up 
in gunpowder has been used by this nation for education and the 
nourishing of art. Sweden is small and those who judge everything 
by size must use another criterion to appreciate her. If they will 
approach her humbly they will find much to learn and even more to 
enjoy within the confines of her lovely fringed and ravelled shores. 
(Rothery, 1934, 5)
In a chapter titled “Preparing for Peace”, Rothery reflected more 
closely on Sweden’s development from a warrior nation, a great power in 
the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, to something quite differ-
ent. Old garrison cities and naval bases like Kristianstad and Karlskrona 
had lost much of their significance:
 …since, in 1925, [Sweden] prepared for peace by a sensible reduction 
and reorganization of both her army and navy and hopes ultimately 
to do away with all wars and preparation for them. To be sure, two 
thousand men are employed in the manufacture of munitions at 
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the Bofors plant on orders that are three years in advance. But most 
of these orders under the Geneva Traffic in Arms Act are for other 
nations. (Rothery, 1934, 150–151)
Thus, an ambiguity that would remain present in most takes on 
Swedish peaceableness was introduced from the outset, although the 
tension between non-belligerence and providing others with arms did 
not seem to bother Rothery. In the same context, she quoted one of 
the articles that had recently singled out Sweden as a positive example 
in political debates. Under the heading “Sweden: Where Capitalism is 
Controlled”, Marquis Childs had stated his first Swedological position 
in Harper’s Monthly in late 1933. He had also invoked the theme of peace 
in the opening of his argument:
The Scandinavian countries [Sweden, Norway and Denmark] have 
developed during the past hundred years more or less apart from the 
violent national and political passions of continental Europe. Aside 
from a healthy national rivalry, they have lived in peace and harmony. 
(Childs, 1933, 749)
Childs returned to the theme in the end, at the moment when this arti-
cle contrasted most starkly against the argument that he would make two 
and a half years later. Supporting the “first” New Deal in 1933, Childs’s 
point actually came closer to conveying the message that many superfi-
cial latter-day readers, anachronistically, have read into his famous book. 
Here he actually claimed that Sweden was taking a middle road between 
the USA and the Soviet Union, pointing to the new Social Democratic 
cabinet’s ambitions to create a measure of discontinuity in Swedish his-
tory. Dealing with the emergency of depression – launching a “drastic 
unemployment programme” – they were “trying to restore purchasing 
power” in a way that Childs said resembled what J. M. Keynes had pro-
posed (three years before the book that launched Keynesianism as such):
But the Social-Democrats have not forgotten their ultimate goal. It is 
possible that, if world capitalism now gains a breathing space, there 
may be completed in Sweden the gradual and orderly transition 
from one type of economic life to another. The very fact that such a 
transition may be possible is enormously heartening. (Childs, 1933, 
758)
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Any revolution instigated by the Social Democratic party, no matter 
how peaceful or gradual, would never be a part of Childs’s argument in 
Sweden: The Middle Way. Continuity rather than transition from one 
system to another, and grass-roots action rather than central dirigisme 
as a source of gradual change, became themes when he finished his 
book in late 1935. With regard to the value of the cabinet’s crisis poli-
cies in helping Sweden to a smoother way through the depression than 
most countries (a key element in his message), Childs was fairly scep-
tical. In a manner that would later become common wisdom among 
historians, he assumed that the general economic effects had been mar-
ginal, although he deemed the policies to be sound for other reasons. 
In any case, a theme about peaceful internal societal development had 
a strong presence between the lines throughout the book. The empha-
sized non-Utopian nature of Sweden’s exemplariness was related to “the 
Swede’s” lack of interest in lofty visions and ideological schemes, and 
focus on concrete problem solving. His rationality was not looking for 
ideal perfection, but for reasonable solutions through arguments gained 
in discussion and negotiation.
Childs would carry on stressing this theme. In 1938, he added a chap-
ter in the second edition of The Middle Way, roughly integrating recent 
steps towards a more elaborated welfare state, such as population policy 
measures inspired by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, into his main message. 
But those matters were not his main interest after his success in 1936. 
The following years he worked on a sequel, which was published in the 
autumn of 1938. The title was This is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in 
Scandinavia. The matter at hand was, as he stated from the outset, “the 
status of labor and the problem of trade-union organization”. The back-
ground was the new rules of the game established in the US, as a part 
of “the second New Deal”. The Wagner Act of 1935 in particular had cre-
ated a new landscape in industrial relations. Childs attempted to intro-
duce Scandinavia in general, and Sweden very much in particular, as 
a source of inspiration. It was certainly not expected to be possible to 
imitate the example in the US, but it pointed towards hopeful possibil-
ities. One of the main themes in the book was a sudden, dramatic his-
torical shift. The Swedish labour market had for decades been probably 
the most conflict ridden in the world. Due to an unusually high level of 
organization among both parties, in the Capitalist camp as well as that 
of Labour, it had been characterized by recurring strikes and lockouts 
on a mass scale, making the economy of the nation bleed. As from 1936, 
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industrial relations were rapidly heading towards a state of construc-
tive coexistence between the parties, even some form of cooperation.
But Childs had been too eager to bring the gospel of Scandinavian la-
bour peace over the Atlantic, a fate he shared with a commission on in-
dustrial relations in Sweden within the Roosevelt administration (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 1938). A few weeks after his book was published, 
the Swedish federations of trade unions and employer organizations made 
it out of date. They did so by signing the epoch-making basic agreement 
that was the outcome of two years of negotiations at the Saltsjöbaden re-
sort, near Stockholm. With the Saltsjöbaden peace treaty, “the Swedish 
Model” within the labour market was established in December 1938. The 
basic agreement would be completed with four follow-up agreements 
during the subsequent decade. The fundamental feature of this “model” 
was the rule that the parties should deal with their own problems through 
negotiation, without interference from the state. “The Swedish Model”, 
in this sense of the term, was all about limiting the role of political deci-
sions and the public sector. (Social policies such as state-regulated mini-
mum wages would be a non-issue in Sweden, and remain so today. State 
authorities would soon play mainly a service role in this context, e.g. meet-
ing the private sector parties’ joint interests of creating “mobility” within 
the labour market of the 1950s and 60s. During those decades’ avalanche 
of urbanization, the Labour Market Board (AMS) would lead concerted 
efforts together with shrinking municipalities in the countryside, and ex-
panding municipalities in the cities, in order to deal with the social chal-
lenges of deracination and resettlement. Interventionist labour market 
legislation initiated by the trade unions in the mid-1970s – prescribing 
forms of co-determination and regulating aspects of hiring and firing – 
would in fact terminate the labour market model in its classic Saltsjöbaden 
sense.) Childs had been too keen to share his experience as an observer 
of the formation of the Saltsjöbaden spirit of “common understanding” 
(samförstånd). But American readers would soon get rich opportunities 
to study the contents of the Saltsjöbaden agreement. A translation of the 
peace treaty’s whole text was published for the 1939 New York World’s 
Fair, in a book by Sigfrid Hansson, director of the state’s Social Board, 
the prime minister’s brother and for decades a leading ideologist of the 
trade union movement (Hansson, 1939). Two scholarly studies went 
into great depths with the marvels of the new order in 1941 and 1942: 
Paul H. Norgren’s The Swedish Collective Bargaining System and James 
J. Robbins’s The Government of Labor Relations in Sweden.
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The message in Childs’s forgotten book could not have been affirmed 
more strongly. The phenomenon of labour peace would remain a corner-
stone in Swedological writings for decades to come. Few contributions 
failed to mention it. Two reasons for this are obvious. Firstly, this was 
something that was unquestionably unique, even sensational, in Swedish 
society. With member rates soon approaching a hundred per cent among 
blue-collar workers, the trade unions appeared to work in harmony with 
a mirror-image set of organizations on the opposite side. Secondly, the 
spirit of common understanding in industrial relations was intimately 
linked to the marvel that attracted foreign attention to the Swedish case in 
the first place: her industrial Cinderella story. From 1938 to 1976 Sweden’s 
path from rags to riches bore testimony to two facts that Swedologists 
were forced to accept and challenged to interpret: economic progress was 
clearly compatible with high levels of trade union and employer organi-
zation, and was also compatible with elaborate and centralized forms of 
collective bargaining. In David Jenkins’s earlier mentioned book Sweden 
and the Price of Progress from 1968, the chapter on “The Great Labor Peace 
Apparatus” was a cornerstone. The phenomenon had not become less 
remarkable over the years. Jenkins described the chummy relations be-
tween the leaders of the trade unions and the employer organizations as 
“the business world’s counterpart to the bearded lady or the three-headed 
calf ”. He talked about “the spirit of Saltsjöbaden” as something bafflingly 
genuine: “[A]n effort by a suspicious investigator to uncover the truth 
beneath the surface amiability and mutual respect is apt to come upon a 
solid core of amiability and mutual respect” ( Jenkins, 1968, 133).
Wartime interpretations: a land of hope or treason?
In the final years before the outbreak of World War II, a whole set of 
Swedophile books were published on both sides of the Atlantic. But it 
would not be until the dramatic spring of 1940 that the first volume in 
the genre with a strict focus on peace and international relations was 
available. Its author, Alma Luise Olson, can be said to have been the first 
contributor to the genre of Swedology, as she had written the main piece 
in the National Geographic’s theme issue in 1928 (Olson, 1928). Due to 
her family background and language skills, her focus was Swedish. But 
she tried hard to make Scandinavia: The Background for Neutrality a 
book in which the Nordic countries – including Finland and Iceland – 
were treated as equals. They were together forming the phenomenon she 
aimed to draw attention to. Olson had obviously been working on the 
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manuscript for years. But the conditions for making the book’s argument 
had shifted dramatically since the bulk of the text had been written be-
fore the outbreak of the war. The final text appears to have been deliv-
ered during the weeks immediately after the end of the Winter War, in 
which Finland had successfully defended her independence against the 
Soviet Union (despite formally losing the war), and in the weeks before 
the occupation of Denmark and Norway by German troops, on April 9. 
A supplement was added somewhat later, immediately before printing, 
in which the story was continued beyond April 9.
The main argument, phrased before Sweden became the only coun-
try to stay out of the war, was basically this. Norway, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland and Sweden had together set an example for the world. In the 
recent phase of history, they had shown a practical and constructive path 
to genuine and stable peace. Olson’s point was that the Nordic coun-
tries – not long ago a field of recurring wars among the heirs of the fierce 
Vikings – had begun to materialize a new kind of union. In a way, it was 
a more constructive version of the Kalmar Union of the late medieval 
era. What made this community so attractive was that the sources of 
peace came from beneath, growing upwards. Formal deals and arrange-
ments top-down played a marginal role. Together the countries had 
created a kind of pact, turning their corner of a militarized world into 
a peaceable oasis. Together they were defending the ideals of neutral-
ity and peace, together doing everything they could do to prop up the 
all-too-weak League of Nations. Summing up the theme of “A United 
North” in her introduction, Olson turned to Finland for a fitting meta-
phor. Under the heading “Kantele” she admitted that the “New North” 
would be “treated lightly” in an era of diplomacy shaped by great pow-
ers “arming to teeth and testing their cannons and bombing planes to 
give more point to their assurances that they are steering the interna-
tional ship of state into the safe harbor of peace”. The Nordic example 
could be dismissed as a “primitive” contribution to statesmanship. But 
it called to mind the five-stringed instrument Kantele, usually tuned 
in minor, which in the Kalevala legends were invented by the gentle 
Väinämöinen, “who believed that harmony and not brute force rules 
the world” (Olson, 1940, 44).
Olson thus portrayed each of the Nordic countries quite generally, 
in order to understand what had made the model case of the peaceable 
North possible. The phenomenon was mainly seen as a matter of culture 
and attitudes, growing out of peculiar patterns of societal development. 
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In a chapter named “A Strong State”, Olson started out with the Swedish 
case. In a passage written with the Finnish Winter War as a backdrop, she 
discussed the fact that neutrality was still “the slogan”. Olson referred 
to the Scandinavian representatives’ plea to the League of Nations in 
December 1939 for help for Finland as being consistent with two decades 
of work for war prevention, disarmament, arbitration and conciliation, 
striving to avoid turning the League into an instrument for punishing 
members. This led to a vindication of the Swedish position:
Today Sweden, together with the rest of the North, would be the first 
to cooperate in any constructive plan for union in Europe that does 
not stress collective defense but aims at law and justice. Bounded 
by the many isms east and south and west – all reducing themselves 
plainly to the one idea of imperialism – the Swedish State, a strong 
State, has every moral and humane right to refuse to serve as the 
battlefield for any clashing ideologies or for any alien armed forces 
whatever. (Olson, 1940, 115–116)
Having said this, Olson was eager to stress the Swedish support for 
Finland’s cause, in the form of both aid and sympathy with her “coura-
geous stand” against the Soviet pretence of “helping to set up a people’s 
government”, disguising crass strategic military goals. Olson actually 
failed to point out that Sweden’s stance in this case was her formally most 
clear-cut aberration from strict neutrality policies (and remains so), as 
she declared herself to be a non-belligerent party in the war, not a neutral 
one. Sweden did not send armed troops. But her aid and semi-official 
mobilization of volunteer soldiers were clear acts of partisanship. This 
may not have fitted Olson’s argument, as she carried on with an oblique 
reference to the recent state of peace within the Swedish labour market: 
“Swedish capital and labor are combined in loyal support of the ideals 
of free government, freedom of speech and democracy in the whole of 
the North, for these traditions of the centuries are now threatened by 
the totalitarian aggressors” (Olson, 1940, 115–116).
Anticipating many Swedophile arguments over the following decades, 
Olson indicated that the Swedes were choosing neutrality, not in order 
to avoid responsibility, but on the contrary as a way to take responsibility. 
In her view, Sweden was the backbone of a Scandinavian zone of neutral-
ity, with five nations working together to twist the globe in the direction 
of peace founded on justice and freedom for all – in particular for small 
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nations in a world of bullies. In the postscript that took the story beyond 
April 9 – “Wherein the Background for Neutrality becomes a Target in 
Flank Warfare” – Olson described the Swedes’ new situation in a way that 
may be read as a defence against anticipated criticisms: “A loyal Sweden 
that pleads for Northern peace and freedom and neutrality, as ideals to 
be recaptured, has not ignored the tragedy that has befallen Denmark 
and Norway”. The book ended by stating that “the story of Scandinavia 
and the unconquerable spirit of the North, though temporarily muted, 
is not ended. Only while the battles rage, the voices pleading for peace 
are silenced” (Olson, 1940, 337–338).
Sweden’s way to navigate the stormy waters of World War II did meet 
criticism. The first full volume with a Swedoclastic intent was actually 
published in 1943. Its whole message was to debunk images created by 
Swedophiles, in order to warn the allied countries – in particular the 
American opinion – not to trust Sweden as a truly neutral country, or 
to trust the Swedes in any respect at all. The sarcastic title was Stalwart 
Sweden. The author was a left-wing German refugee named Joachim 
Joesten. He was married to a Swedish woman and had spent some years 
in Sweden before going to the USA. He used his experience, contacts 
and frame of reference from his time in Sweden to support the many 
public voices of suspicion that were actually heard in America. He of-
fered a more elaborate argument. Laying bare the logic of debunkery that 
is still forming most Swedological writings, the book’s main strategy was 
to smash images established by Swedophiles. The theme was explicit 
from the outset. Joesten warned of any illusions about Finland being 
anything else than an enemy. Finland was not an exception, fighting its 
“private war”, as she now fought against the Soviets and the British in 
alliance with Nazi Germany: 
The people who continue blandly to credit this dangerous nonsense 
usually are also the stanchest [sic] believers in the Swedish myth. 
This myth has sprung from various sources. Its roots reach back to the 
early thirties, when roving reporters and “social tourists” discovered 
Scandinavia, which had been, to centuries, almost ignored by the 
world. The foreign visitors, searching the globe for a place where 
people lived peacefully and prosperously in an atmosphere of social 
progress and international co-operation, found Scandinavia, and, 
in particular, Sweden, came very close to their dreams. They were 
enchanted by what they saw and heard, and they eagerly rushed 
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their findings into print. That was the era of “Sweden: The Middle 
Way”, and similar eulogies. Overnight a little known and neglected 
country rose to the rank of a world sensation. Here, between the 
latitudes 55° and 69° North, was Utopia. The glowing picture which 
the enthusiastic Utopia-seekers drew of Sweden was, on the whole, 
justified, though many of the books were written in a spirit of 
uncritical admiration for everything Swedish. As the years went by, 
however, the picture almost imperceptibly changed: the light lost 
much of its luster, the shade expanded and grew more opaque. But 
the Middle-Way enthusiasts never even noticed the transformation. 
The lengthening shadow that fell over the Swedish picture was Hitler’s. 
The tourists and the fiction writers did not notice it, but the statesmen 
and political observers did – or at least some of them did. They began 
to wonder how Utopia would stand up in the great test to come. 
When the Swedes realized that their prestige in the world was getting 
a little tarnished, they launched a methodical and, on the whole, 
effective propaganda drive to keep the picture of the old Sweden 
alive in foreign minds. Thus what originally had been the truth about 
Sweden gradually became the Swedish myth. ( Joesten, 1943, 2–3)
It is notable here that Joesten, who later during the war came forward 
with his sympathies for the Soviet Union, was explicitly not inimical to 
the internal workings of Swedish society. He fought against the remain-
ing trust in Sweden as an actor in the international arena. But Joesten 
reinforced his argument by drawing attention to the activities of the 
American-Swedish News Exchange (ASNE), which had opened its office 
in Manhattan in 1922, with a corresponding office in Stockholm. These 
offices were run by a foundation that counted many of the major figures 
of official Sweden among its founders, ranging from the Archbishop of 
the Church of Sweden, Nathan Söderblom, to the Social Democrats’ 
party leader and first prime minister Hjalmar Branting (both of them 
soon Nobel Peace Prize laureates). The Swedish state was one of the fi-
nancial benefactors. But just as important was the economic support 
from Swedish industry and trade interests. They saw a business invest-
ment in cultivating positive images of Sweden abroad, in particular in 
the USA. On a regular basis, the ASNE supported journalists writing 
about Sweden, supplying them with selected photos and pieces of in-
formation. Many books on Sweden, including Childs’s The Middle Way, 
were supported in a similar way (Kastrup, 1985).
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Joesten described the ASNE as being controlled by Swedish au-
thorities, and thus uncompromisingly loyal to the state. But, con-
trasting with Olson’s way of alluding to the harmony between capital 
and labour in Sweden, he also stressed the extent to which it was 
financed by capitalist interests, “a representative cross section of 
Swedish big business”. Joesten listed them in detail: Axel Axelson 
Johnson, SKF, Svenska Amerikalinjen, AB Bofors Nobelkrut, SCA, 
Electrolux, Broström-koncernen, AB Separator, LM Ericsson, AB de 
Lavals Ångturbin, Sandvikens Jernverk, AB Ljungströms Ångturbin, 
Elektriska Svetsnings AB, and also Kooperativa Förbundet – the con-
sumer co-op organization that had been the crown jewel of Swedish 
society in Childs’s The Middle Way. Joesten also claimed that the three 
wealthiest and most influential of these businesses were all controlled 
by Axel Wenner-Gren, who had been blacklisted in the USA and Great 
Britain “as an individual doing business with the Axis”. The core of 
Sweden’s role as Nazi Germany’s fifth column was obviously crass 
economic interests. According to Joesten, the picture of Sweden cul-
tivated by the ASNE was completely misleading: 
That a small country like Sweden should do its best to build 
up prestige in the eyes of a determining power like America 
is understandable and justified; but not to the point where 
miscalculations may result with possibly catastrophic consequences. 
I am keenly aware of all that is good or even excellent in Sweden. 
If, perhaps, I dwell in greater detail on the shade of the picture than 
on its light, it is because the ASNE and sympathetic writers already 
are doing all they can to bring out the rosy colors. If this had not 
been done to excess, there would be no need at all to present the 
case against Sweden. Nor would this be necessary if we were still at 
peace. In times of war it is sound policy to look at both sides of the 
medal, even at the cost of destroying a dear and hallowed illusion. 
I am also aware that in doing this I lay myself open to the charge of 
vindictiveness, because of my personal experiences in Sweden, which 
have not always been of a pleasant nature. ( Joesten, 1943, 6–7)
Joesten never said what his unpleasant experiences were. But he prom-
ised to deliver facts in the case against Sweden. Through over 200 pages 
he acted as the devil’s advocate against Sweden’s alleged sainthood. Most 
things that would later be regularly mentioned in darker domestic images 
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of Sweden’s record from the war were discussed. Joesten certainly in-
cluded the obvious and drastic deviations from a strict neutrality policy 
in compliance with Germany, such as the traffic with permittents (un-
armed soldiers) from Norway between 1940 and 1943, and the transit 
of a complete armed division, Engelbrecht, in sealed railway carriages 
from Norway to Finland in the summer of 1941. Joesten also discussed 
the censorship of newspapers, having printed anti-Nazi material or crit-
icism of the Swedish concessions, and the suppression of entertainer 
Karl-Gerhard’s mockery from the cabaret stage of the Germans and 
their influence in Sweden. The widespread Nazi sympathies within 
the Swedish society were stressed. They could be traced even to the 
ranks of the war coalition cabinet (which included all parties except 
the Communists). Joesten’s final message retained a glimpse of hope, 
though. But against the backdrop of what had been said on the previ-
ous pages, it was tiny: 
Sweden is no poor, harmless lamb at the mercy of the Nazi wolf. 
She is no more in an inescapable vise than Germany herself is in now. 
Sweden, I hope to have shown in this book, is a powerful, if small, 
nation. In the past she has pursued a coolly selfish and even callous 
policy. In April 1940 and in June 1941 she let two great opportunities 
go by for tipping the balance in favor of a better world. A third, and 
last, such opportunity is in the offing. May Sweden see the light. 
( Joesten, 1943, 205)
A model for the post-war world?
Not many years would pass before the mill of positive images of Sweden 
was running again. As before the war, this happened with eager assistance 
from the ASNE. In 1949 probably the most enthusiastic portrait ever was 
published, Hudson Strode’s Sweden: A Model for a World. This volume 
was written during a trip on which the author was accompanied by the 
ASNE’s new director, Allan Kastrup, who happened to be home for a 
summer holiday. It was dedicated to the former director, Naboth Hedin – 
a major villain from Joesten’s book. The quality of Strode’s depiction was 
disputed, even within the ASNE circle. The co-worker in Stockholm 
who had been Marquis Childs’s main helping hand in the mid-1930s, 
Nils Horney, wrote a somewhat acerbic review. In particular, he pointed 
to Strode’s tendency to actually claim that Sweden was a kind of mate-
rialized Utopia, where everything was well ordered, beautiful and nice 
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(Horney, 1949). Such claims were in fact rarely made by Swedophiles 
during the golden era of Swedology – if ever, after Childs’s polemic 
against it in 1936 – although most Swedoclasts, like Joesten, tended to 
postulate that their adversaries did so all the time.
In the same year, another American book was published with keen 
assistance from the ASNE and Nils Horney. The author, David Hinshaw, 
was a pacifist with a Quaker background. The title conveyed the main 
message, Sweden: Champion of Peace. This was the first – maybe the 
only – whole book on the case of Sweden specifically as a moral lesson 
for world affairs. In 1949 Olson’s vision was dead: the Nordic defence 
pact that Sweden had striven for after the war had proved to be impos-
sible. Denmark, Norway and Iceland became NATO members. Finland 
remained neutral, but in a subdued relationship with the Soviet Union 
in exchange for her liberty to remain a Western democracy with a capi-
talist economy. Sweden was starting her career as the sole player in her 
own game of non-isolationist neutrality, soon tending towards “active 
neutrality”. Hinshaw’s original argument may have been very similar 
to Olson’s. More than most Swedologists, he started out talking about 
Scandinavia in general. The Scandinavian example was basically said 
to illustrate something that had been claimed by left-wing pacifists for 
decades, namely that social justice – development in the sense of solving 
social problems and creating real individual life opportunities for all – 
was a precondition for long-term and stable peace, if not eternal peace. 
People with an increasing rate of problems solved tended to be gradu-
ally more and more peaceable: 
One Scandinavian contribution [to mankind], potentially by far 
the most important of all their contributions, is their creation of 
a formula for world peace. Its potency is overlooked because it rests 
on such a simple truth: world peace can be built on a foundation of 
domestic tranquility – that is, peaceful relations within a nation. This 
is the magic ingredient with which lasting peaceful international 
relations can be created. I advance no claim that the Scandinavian 
peoples set out to create an international peace formula, if their 
discovery can be called that. Nor do they hold that they have 
discovered one. On the contrary they insist, and the record supports 
their point, that they have centered their efforts on treating 
the individual citizen with the justice, integrity, tolerance, and 
consideration that they say is his rightful due. (Hinshaw, 1949, 3)
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Hinshaw suggested that the Scandinavians had made successful ef-
forts to subdue a “combative spirit” inherited from their Viking forbears. 
This training had made them less likely to get angry at anyone. He car-
ried on, stressing that the Scandinavian example was about much more 
than loyally supporting the United Nations: 
When a man is not angry at anyone he does not seek a fight. If he 
does not seek a fight, he is less likely to get into one, either home or 
abroad. Thus their peace-formula is a by-product of a way of life; just 
as sainthood is achieved by being rather than in striving to be. This 
indirect Scandinavian approach to world peace, which starts with the 
individual and ends with the state, rests on the opposite pole of the 
League of Nations or the United Nations approach, which started with 
the whole world in their design to reach the individual man. Which 
is the better or more practical method is not a point of discussion here. 
The world method was mentioned to bring out, by contrast, the nature 
and effectiveness of the Scandinavian method. If the world method 
will work, it might become universally effective in a much shorter time 
than could the Scandinavian one. But the Scandinavian method is more 
durable because its strength comes from individual conviction rather 
than from complicated organizational procedures. Related to domestic 
tranquility as an aid to peaceful living is the need for man to close the 
yawning and threatening gap that separates his scientific and engineering 
progress and his spiritual and social development. This the Scandinavian 
peoples have been rather successful in doing. (Hinshaw, 1949, 3–4)
Through almost 300 pages, Hinshaw told his readers about the ways 
in which Swedish society and the Swedish experience conveyed such 
an indirect message to the world. Among other things, he delivered a 
take on Sweden’s role during World War II that may be read as a be-
lated polemic against Joesten’s alleged refutation of the idealizations of 
“the Middle-Way enthusiasts”, applying the logic of debunkery from the 
Swedophile angle. Naturally there was a chapter on “Swedish Labor and 
Capital”, stressing the theme of industrial peace. But before Hinshaw 
went into details, he made clear what the virtues of international rele-
vance, embodied by the Swedish nation, really were: 
To the doubting-Thomas reader who holds that because of her 
geographical position and her smallness, little Sweden’s record is of 
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no consequence peacewise, I ask only that he read the book before 
he passes final judgment on this point. I make this request because 
I believe the Swedish peace story that I have sensed and tried to 
interpret, which rests on her people’s ardent desire to solve problems 
without bitterness, will convince him that neither the geographical 
position nor the physical size of a country has any important 
relationship either to the extent of a people’s wisdom or to the 
high value they place on certain neglected virtues such as patience, 
perseverance, caution, integrity, and cooperative action. (Hinshaw, 
1949, 7)
It was possible to argue in this manner concerning Sweden even 
before she really had developed her peculiar role in the Cold War era. 
Someone who believed Hinshaw’s message about “Tranquility at Home – 
Peace Abroad” would hardly hesitate to ask the Swedes to negotiate 
peace or to guard peace agreements throughout the world. The era of 
Hammarskjöld and Swedish blue berets seems to have been well pre-
pared in terms of arguments and expectations. 
Virtues and vices of “active neutrality”  
in the Vietnam War era
The land of future: heaven and hell
Nevertheless, the 1950s would witness a wave of Swedoclastic coun-
ter-mobilization. As general enthusiasm about Sweden as an exemplar 
mainly blossomed among left-leaning Liberals in the USA, Labourites 
in the UK, Socialists in France and Social Democrats in West Germany 
(rebranding themselves after the Swedish sister party’s model with the 
Godesberg programme of 1959), much of the effort to turn the Swedish 
case into a deterrent would be made by their conservative adversaries. 
This tendency was gradually reinforced, year after year, since the Social 
Democrats kept on forming the cabinets in Sweden, imparting the im-
pression that they were thus also forming Swedish society after their 
own will and blueprint. (This naïve illusion would soon also dominate 
Swedish historiography.) But the patterns of Swedology were complex. 
Forces to the left would soon also show interest in debunking what ap-
peared to be a peaceful, non-revolutionary, non-Marxist, alternative path 
to socialism. For example, the leading British Labour Party ideologist 
Anthony Crosland’s pleads for trust in the Swedish example in The Future 
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of Socialism in 1956 would become one of the first targets of the New Left 
Review, featuring an ambitious attack on “Mr. Crosland’s Dreamland” by 
the young Marxist Perry Anderson in 1961. In any case, Sweden became 
the symbol of the far-reaching welfare state. Most Swedoclasts warned 
that the Swedish case featured too much socialism, while quite a few on 
the contrary saw too little of it – if any at all. In the era of the Cold War, 
Sweden attained an ambiguous position in terms of putative socialism. 
Her security policies (including arms exports) and peculiar form of neu-
trality were seldom ignored in interpretations of this.
The predominant strategy in Swedoclastic arguments was to raise the 
question of whether the Swedes really were happy in their supposed 
paradise – stating that they actually were not. Seeking comfort, Swedes 
typically drank heavily and indulged in unbridled sex – if they did not 
kill themselves. Sex, alcohol, drugs and suicide were soon parts of a 
widespread national stereotype. The theme of sex got a breakthrough 
in 1955, when an article on “Swedish sin” in Time magazine responded 
creatively to the introduction of mandatory sexual education in Swedish 
schools (Hale, 2003). Swedophile replies were often ambivalent, both 
absolving Swedes from accusations of promiscuousness and claiming 
their fairly relaxed attitudes to be sound. A less complex target was ar-
guments about high suicide rates, although the strategies to debunk 
those as a sign of unhappiness shifted. In 1960, President Eisenhower 
used the established stereotype of sex, alcohol and suicide in a “fairly 
friendly European country” to get back at one of his most influential 
critics, Marquis Childs (Östlund, 2014, 181–184). That an ultra-modern 
Swedish mentality was cold, callous and streamlined – a negative ex-
pression of technological progress – became a related theme in a host of 
analyses of the Swedish psyche. One example is the British philosopher 
Kathleen Nott’s A Clean, Well-Lighted Place: A Private View of Sweden 
from 1961, written from a strongly modernist-rationalistic point of view, 
that could have been expected to predispose to sympathetic attitudes. 
A somewhat similar view, then stated from a far-left position, was offered 
in Susan Sontag’s “Letter from Sweden”, published in 1969 in the major 
counter-culture magazine Ramparts.
Opening his aforementioned book from 1968 by taking stock of 
claims made about Sweden during the 1950s and 60s, David Jenkins 
complained about the “silliness that permeates some of the Swedological 
writing” ( Jenkins, 1968, 17). New takes were published all the time. It is 
unclear whether Jenkins’s survey included Enrico Altavilla’s book Svezia: 
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Inferno e paradiso, published in Italy in 1967 – and in Franco’s Spain in 
1969, in a translation that would remain in print well into the 1980s. This 
book immediately inspired a Mondo film – the “shockumentary” genre 
launched in Italy in the 1960s. Using the same title as Altavilla’s book 
in Italian, Sweden – Heaven and Hell gained some global success in 1968 
and 1969. Director Luigi Scattini exploited the commercial potential of 
Swedoclasm, in particular the theme of Swedish sin. The basic idea was 
probably to sell soft porn (by Italian measures of the 1960s), legitimizing 
naked breasts by means of indignation. But Scattini’s film also deployed a 
whole arsenal of claims made to Sweden’s disadvantage in Swedological 
writings, twisting them some extra turns. Sweden was an affluent high-
tech nightmare. Old people died alone, abandoned by their families. 
The police terrorized car drivers with alcohol tests while ignoring real 
criminality. Heavy drugs permeated society. Drunkards spread shoe 
polish on bread in order to extract alcohol. Gang rapes turned young 
women into outrageously active lesbians as adults. Beautiful blond girls 
preferred black men to the “Latin lover” (in a scene clearly addressed to 
Italians considering going to Sweden as guest workers). People killed 
themselves en masse. The Swedes were certainly not happy, although the 
sexual part of their compensations was ambiguous. The film also made 
quite an affair of Sweden’s peaceable image and neutral status. Staying 
out of every war, the Swedes had been able to use their stunning re-
sources and technological skills to prepare for a nuclear war. They had 
built a whole world of comfortable air-raid shelters deep down under 
the granite. The vision of the future at the end of the film was, thus, 
that the only survivors of the coming nuclear apocalypse would be the 
Swedes. Reconnecting to the theme of sex (naked girls on islet rocks in 
the Stockholm archipelago), the Swedes were expected to repopulate 
and take over the world, rapidly. Sweden was turned into il paese del fu-
turo in the most literal way imaginable.
Global pseudo-conscience as a safety valve in Dystopia
Sweden as a crystal ball, revealing the future, was also the basic approach, 
but in a far more serious way, in the most elaborate anathema of the post-
war Swedological literature (Östlund, 2007). In 1971, the British jour-
nalist Roland Huntford, a conservative Catholic with a background in 
South Africa, published The New Totalitarians. Its success would almost 
rival that of Childs’s The Middle Way. Before a slightly revised new edi-
tion reached American and British readers in 1975, it had been published 
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in German as Wohlfahrtsdiktatur: Das schwedische Modell, in French as 
Le nouveau totalitarisme, in Norwegian as Formynderstaten and in Danish 
as Fagre ny Sverige: Demokrati eller Demokratur? The contents were sen-
sational enough to render a translation (although an extremely free one) 
in Swedish as well, titled Blinda Sverige – “Blind Sweden”. An exception 
in its genre, it thus also reached the only audience for which it was not 
written, the Swedish one. The argument of The New Totalitarians was 
fairly sophisticated, applying a peculiar logic of its own. Even negative 
Swedish reviewers admitted that kernels of truth shone through. Around 
them, Huntford had spun a remarkably dark portrait. In stark contrast 
to Swedoclast pioneer Joesten, Huntford ignored the existence of the 
genre he contributed to. He indicated the profoundly polemical nature 
of his analysis only indirectly. But the whole argument was built as an 
attempt to debunk the Swedophiles’ debunkery of the Swedoclastic debun-
keries of the Swedophiles’ purportedly Utopian images, thereby revealing 
Sweden to be a true Dystopia.
Huntford’s overarching claim was simple, though. Whereas the 
Soviet Union and her satellites had roughly materialized the nightmare 
of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, characterized by brutal force 
and suppressed discontent, Sweden was something far worse. She was 
the real-world version of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. The prob-
lem with the Swedes was thus not that they were unhappy in their ad-
mired society. Quite the contrary. They were in truth very contented and 
nauseatingly proud of their society. The rulers in Huxley’s nightmare 
used all means available to make their subjects love their servitude. This 
was also the predicament for Sweden. In the Soviet bloc people hated 
their servitude. In Sweden they loved it. Sweden had taken the route to 
extreme technological modernity, and realized its totalitarian potenti-
alities completely. The Swedish case made a future visible that would 
meet the rest of the world if it followed the same track. The main cause 
making extreme modernity possible was a bit paradoxical though. The 
Swedes were extremely backwards on the inside, according to Huntford. 
They had medieval minds. Their souls lacked the slightest vestige of indi-
vidualism. They were true collectivists by nature. Sweden was not at all a 
Western country, in stark contrast to Norway and Denmark. Historically, 
Sweden was a part of the same Eastern world of pre-modern collec-
tivism as Russia. This assumption was underlined by terminological 
choices. For example, Huntford called state boards like Socialstyrelsen 
and Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen “directorates”.
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But collectivism by virtue of inborn easternness was insufficient to 
make modern Swedes love their servitude. They had also had to be men-
tally manipulated by their “rulers” since the 1930s. The Social Democrats 
were portrayed as the modern inheritors of the old Swedish autocratic 
state and its bureaucratic power machine (including the Lutheran 
church). Mind control was applied in the spirit of Brave New World, 
and the key term in the book was social engineering. The main means of 
manipulation were wealth and welfare, material abundance and social 
care doled out by state expertise. On that foundation, more advanced 
forms of mental manipulation were developed – through the educational 
system, through culture policies and through mass media. One feature 
of Orwell’s Dystopia was also applicable in the Swedish case, namely 
a form of newspeak, in which “security”, trygghet, was the cornerstone. 
According to this logic it was possible for Huntford to twist familiar 
Swedoloclast themes in new ways. The problem with suicides was not 
that there were so many. It was that they were committed in a certain 
way, for certain reasons. Swedes killed themselves, taking a desperate 
escape for individualists in a world of mental conformity. The problem 
with teenage sex was not higher rates of premarital intercourse in Sweden 
than elsewhere (it was a global trend). It was that young Swedes had sex 
in a certain way, carrying out the will of the “rulers”. They enjoyed free, 
completely shameless, and thus mechanical and callous sex, using it as 
a safety valve. Hidden frustrations in a completely controlled existence 
were regulated in this way. This was mainly discussed in a chapter on 
“The Sexual Branch of Social Engineering”.
Much was taken for granted in Huntford’s implicit polemics. The 
readers were, for example, expected to know that Sweden was often 
assumed to be a paragon of true democracy. They were expected to 
know that her peaceable history and attempts to take responsibility in 
the world were respected and idealized by Swedophiles. Furthermore, 
readers were supposed to be familiar with Swedoclasts’ ordinary way of 
denouncing Sweden as an actor on the international scene. Huntford’s 
readers were supposed to have heard claims that Sweden shirked from 
her responsibilities through her neutrality policies, while taking a free 
ride, leaning on NATO for her security anyway. They were expected to 
have been exposed to the idea that Sweden was loyal to the Western 
democracies only on the surface, revealing the country’s true nature 
as a soft-socialist state in attacking Western powers as racists, coloni-
alists or imperialists. In Huntford’s concerted argument, the theme of 
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“international Sweden” was discreet but ubiquitous. If nothing else, it 
was present through the many pointers to Sweden’s fundamental east-
ernness and non-westernness. In Huntford’s argument, though, the ac-
tive part of Swedish neutrality policies was turned into a tool of internal 
mental control. As such, it was treated as an immediate parallel to the 
supposed function of unbridled sex among young Swedes. Presumed 
Swedish isolationism through neutrality was not just a betrayal of her 
duties as a Western country – a matter of surprise and indignation. It 
was not at all a deviation from norms applying to her. On the contrary, 
it was a logical behaviour, motivated by internal reasons determined by 
the nature of Swedish society. Active neutrality was another safety valve, 
clearly revealing Sweden not to be a Western country at all, a worse 
case than the Soviet Union herself. This was not a matter of small vices, 
minor aberrations, but indications of immense and fundamental ones.
In the chapter on “Economic Security and Political Servitude”, 
Huntford discussed trygghet as the untranslatably emotional keyword 
in Swedish newspeak – indicating the kind of safety of a harbour in the 
storm, the security in the womb. First among the things trygghet was 
claimed to refer to at a societal level was its meaning in the context of 
international policies, not social welfare: “In the political sense, trygghet 
means neutrality, the avoidance of war and insulation from the troubles 
of the outside world” (Huntford, 1971, 169). Key to massive manipu-
lation of Swedish minds was the task of erasing the national memory. 
Sweden’s “rulers” were creating a new breed of people by eliminating 
all sense of historical consciousness, i.e. beyond the Social Democratic 
Party’s supposed Machtübernahme in the early 1930s. In a chapter called 
“Education in the Service of Conditioning” Huntford told his readers 
that uniformity of opinion had still been achieved in the late 1950s by 
means of traditional nationalism, e.g. nostalgia for Sweden’s era as a great 
power. But this had changed rapidly: 
A decade later, this had swung over to a guided internationalism, 
expressed as solidarity with the underdeveloped countries. It is an 
illustration of the powers held by the central authorities in directing 
what is to be taught. The Directorate of Schools decreed this 
particular ideological shift, and it was obediently enforced. School-
children and school-leavers all over the country displayed the same 
homogeneity of opinion as they had always done, and it was at the 
bidding of the State. (Huntford, 1971, 217–218)
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Huntford described how the Social Democrats had found cultivating 
interest in “underdeveloped countries” to be “politically profitable”, and 
how the fast implementation of this illustrated the extent to which the 
state bureaucracy was independent of parliamentary control, and thus 
a tool of the ruling party. He continued:
By the late 1960s, most teenagers (and younger voters) supported aid 
to the underdeveloped countries, as they had been taught at school. 
This makes an interesting comparison with England or America, 
where attitudes among corresponding groups are generally those 
of indifference with minority groups that are fiercely hostile or in 
favour. But the younger Swedes are uniformly and overwhelmingly 
in favour of overseas technical aid, with a degree of emotionalism 
that may surprise the outsider. This is closely related to neutrality. 
‘Neutrality,’ says a professor at Uppsala University, ‘is like cutting off 
a piece of the personality, and to make up for it we have to find some 
ways of extending our feelings of responsibility – it’s an urge peculiar 
to Sweden. That explains the obsession with the underdeveloped 
countries. It is an approach to the world outside. By identifying 
ourselves with a unit larger than Sweden, we can satisfy a need for 
significance.’ (Huntford, 1971, 218–219)
A bit later this argument was linked to the larger theme of Sweden 
being anything but just another Western country: 
By and large, the educated older Swedes passively regard Western 
Europe as something alien, to which a small number may regretfully 
wish they belonged; younger people display an actively hostile 
attitude. This has largely been achieved by school instruction that the 
only European accomplishment has been to exploit other continents, 
so that the sins of the West have been visited on its virtues. 
By association, all Western European values have been made suspect, 
and what otherwise would have been awkward political heritage has 
been discredited. (Huntford, 1971, 230–231)
The main supporters of this “attack on the West” were mass media, in 
particular school radio and TV. But in Huntford’s view, the attack was 
just a part of a broader phenomenon, which also explained the Swedish 
aloofness towards the EEC, the precursor of the EU:
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As mentioned before, it has been made respectable in the interests 
of international equity, and the atonement for European sins. But it 
has not widened Swedish horizons, it has merely shifted them. By 
diverting attention to other quarters of the globe, and inducing a 
specious glow of solidarity with faraway peoples, it has deepened 
Swedish isolationism by cutting links with Continental neighbours. 
Trade and economics have been no antidote. The expansion of 
Swedish trade with Western Europe, and the resultant commercial 
interdependence, have not been accompanied by an intellectual 
approach to the Continent; but rather the reverse. These 
developments have not gone unnoticed by the outside world. 
A French diplomat taunted a Swede in Brussels when Sweden made 
her half-hearted approach to the Common Market, by saying: ‘You 
would make such good Asians or Africans. Why are you such bad 
Europeans?’ (Huntford, 1971, 231)
The theme of “guided internationalism” as a safety valve was also 
used in a chapter called “Agitprop and the Perpetuation of the Regime”. 
Here the obvious backdrop of the discussion, the Vietnam War, was 
more explicitly referred to. The agitprop of Swedish socialism was 
the adult education organization of the labour movement, the ABF. 
In Huntford’s eyes, this was an anti-democratic tool for keeping the 
Social Democrats in power under a veil of formal democracy. For ex-
ample, it had played its role in a strategy during the elections of 1968, 
and less “violently” in those of 1970, applying the old principle that 
“foreign affairs divert attention from domestic difficulties”. But in the 
Swedish case, the problem was hardly a shortfall, and the diversion 
not war on foreign soil:
What the regime was faced with was not so much embarrassing 
bread-and-butter issues as a nameless frustration mostly (but not 
entirely) found among the youth. It was inherent in the restraints 
of Swedish society. When everything is too well organized, ennui 
is almost bound to appear. And there is in Sweden a taboo on the 
discussion of fundamental domestic issues, born out of a terrible 
fear of rocking the boat. Within Swedish society, there is no room for 
iconoclasm, indignation and the yearning for commitment. Unless 
suitably guided, feelings of this kind could be exceedingly dangerous 
for the government. (Huntford, 1971, 151–152)
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Huntford supported the argument with quotes from Prime Minister 
Olof Palme, speaking of people’s “right to be dissatisfied”, and how fighting 
against sources of dissatisfaction created unity. Attacking the “idea of the 
death of ideologies” Palme had, in both the 1968 and 1970 election cam-
paigns, celebrated the idealism of youth, who were indignantly watching 
“the horrors of the modern world” on TV and caring about “what is going 
on in Africa and Indochina”. Palme concentrated on “other people’s in-
iquities” in order to deflect unrest at home, according to Huntford. This 
train of thought was immediately linked to another of Huntford’s leitmo-
tifs. In his view, Sweden was ruled by the most truly Marxist party in the 
world, something that was not contradicted by the country’s formally pri-
vately owned, capitalist industry. In a spirit of obsession with efficiency, 
private business was controlled by an elaborate web of corporatist strings, 
of which the Saltsjöbaden order of labour peace was only the foremost 
set. Business leaders were no rebels in the Social Democrats’ Sweden. 
Huntford quoted a director of Bofors, the arms industry company, who in 
spite of his pro-American stance and lack of left-wing sympathies thanked 
God for the “Anti-American and Vietnam protest”: without this “out-
let”, keeping “the heat off us”, anything could have happened. This con-
certed attitude among Swedish leaders explained why Sweden, “despite 
neutrality, adopted a militant anti-American pose over Vietnam”. Mass 
media supported this, as did the ABF, whose textbook for study circles 
on “More Equality for a Society with More Justice” presented America 
as the villain – not only in Vietnam, “but in all fields where a cathartic 
bogeyman was useful” (Huntford, 1971, 153).
In the concluding chapter, the theme of Sweden’s relations with the 
world was drawn into the forefront more than anywhere else in The New 
Totalitarians. Huntford riveted his view of how dangerous the Swedish 
path to the future was by pointing to the Swede as both a natural and 
a conditioned shirker from all sense of true responsibility in the world. 
The Swedes were on the one hand hubris-stricken navel-gazers, emo-
tionally chilled to freezing point, and high on the drug of trygghet. On 
the other hand, they were raging enemies of all the core values of the 
West, while excusing themselves by creating the appearance of fighting 
for something even more universal than that. According to Huntford, 
neutrality had “exacted a price”:
It has produced a kind of moral castration, so that collectively the 
Swedes may feel an urge to act, but lack the power to do so. These 
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disabilities may be self-inflicted, but are none the less galling. They are 
compensated by a specialized use of conscience. (Huntford, 1971, 340)
But conscience in the “normal sense” of a spiritual guardian of per-
sonal actions was “scarcely acknowledged” in Sweden. Here it meant 
“conscience to the world”. As a collective, rather than individual concept, 
it always meant condemning others – France, Britain, the USA. The 
Swedes’ “conscience” was always “on the side of the angels”, always di-
rected to “remote corners of the world, from which no immediate dan-
ger may be anticipated” – Algeria, Vietnam, Rhodesia. White America 
was attacked “for the Negroes”. Passion blurred the distinction between 
“righteous and self-righteous indignation”. With targets chosen by “rulers” 
and intellectuals, mobilizing a corporatist system of organizations linked 
to the state, unanimity was established in a way that turned conscience 
into an “exercise in mass emotion”. In this context Huntford made another 
exception from the basic idea that Sweden was a Huxleyan nightmare, 
whereas Soviet-style totalitarianism had only reached the Orwellian level:
Swedish conscience is, in fact, catharsis through ritual hate. It is akin 
to the ‘two minute hate’ of Nineteen Eighty-Four. Indeed, during the 
Vietnam war, the popular Swedish dislike of President Johnson had 
something of the grotesque fury against Goldstein in Orwell’s novel. 
‘I feel so emancipated,’ a Swedish housewife once said in a newspaper 
interview after a particularly violent demonstration before the 
American embassy in Stockholm. (Huntford, 1971, 341)
A self-righteous but fairly admirable world citizen nation
Probably not many Swedophiles attempted to debunk Huntford’s de-
bunkery explicitly. After the international economic crisis had reached 
Sweden in earnest in 1976, Swedoclasts were suddenly able to lean on 
economic arguments, not needing to turn industrial progress into a 
part of the problem, in the way Huntford had to do. At the same time, 
for the same reason, the interest in Sweden began to dwindle. It would 
be fair to say that the last word of the Swedological genre’s golden era 
went to Marquis Childs, in Sweden: The Middle Way on Trial from 1980. 
“Sweden and the World” was the subject of the final chapter. Here, as in 
the rest of the book, Childs’s attitude to Sweden was basically positive. 
But he also stressed a set of reasons to take a distanced, problematizing 
attitude – especially as Sweden still might be suited to serve as a healthy 
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example in many specific respects. Childs emphasized the relative con-
tinuity in Swedish policies, generally, including foreign affairs, after the 
Social Democrats had finally been pushed into opposition in 1976. The 
book did not reveal the fact that Childs had been a fairly outspoken 
voice against the Vietnam War from his tribune as a prominent syndi-
cated columnist. He established that Olof Palme’s actions concerning 
Vietnam had meant a caesura in Sweden’s role in the world. In Childs’s 
view this revealed something about the country in general. There was 
more to it than just the solo actions of one individual:
The Second World War had convinced many Swedes that the major 
powers were ruthless, without scruples of any kind, driven simply 
by a desire for conquest, with the possible exception of America. 
Nowhere, not even in the fiercest antiwar centers in the United 
States, was feeling against the American action in Vietnam stronger 
than in Sweden. One reason was the presence of several hundred – 
the exact number was never established – American deserters and 
draft dodgers. But even without their participation, and apparently at 
times incitation, the protest in the form of repeated demonstrations 
would have occurred. Swedish newspapers and the Swedish state-
owned television and radio gave the war thorough coverage. In the 
Swedish view, here was a great power, a superpower, using the most 
lethal of modern techniques, short of nuclear weapons, to subdue 
a small Asian country resisting the American invasion with 
comparatively little help from any source. (Childs, 1980, 139)
Childs stressed how TV images of the atrocities had fuelled the anger 
among those who felt the injustice. The issue was said to have united 
“every political faction from extreme left to right”. An anti-American 
sentiment was, for example, mirrored in the demonstration that met 
the new US ambassador to Stockholm, the African-American Jerome 
H. Holland (according to Childs in 1968, but it should be 1970), when 
he was called “House nigger”, and the even stronger protests that had 
met Henry Kissinger in 1976. (For deserters and the Holland case, see 
Scott, 2001; Burton, 2009.) Childs also quoted from the speech that 
Olof Palme delivered in 1968, shortly before he became party leader and 
Prime Minister, at a demonstration where he walked side by side with 
the North Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow, stirring up the first dip-
lomatic crisis with the USA during the war. Childs noted that Palme’s 
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criticism was phrased in a language that at that time had been heard 
on every university campus in the USA. Childs also described the sec-
ond crisis, in Christmas 1972, when Palme, “comparing the bombing 
of Cambodia to the genocide practiced by the Nazis”, made President 
Nixon retract his Stockholm ambassador and exclude his Swedish coun-
terpart in Washington from normal diplomatic exchange. But early in 
his review of events, Childs had stressed a Swedish ambivalence towards 
the USA. Memories of World War II were not the only reason:
It became a love-hate relationship, for what Swede could forget the 
great reservoir of Swedish Americans in the new country, many in 
positions of importance both in the private and public sectors, even 
as American bombs were falling on Hanoi. (Childs, 1980, 139)
No person embodied the Swedish ambivalence more clearly than 
Gunnar Myrdal. His career from the epoch-making study of the racial 
question, An American Dilemma, to his analysis of the economy of pov-
erty in the three volumes of Asian Drama was sketched out in a positive 
manner. Myrdal did on the one hand identify strongly with American 
culture and academia, but on the other hand he was one of America’s 
most initiated critics, particularly concerning Vietnam. In matters of 
international responsibility, he represented a certain brand of Swedish 
self-confidence, even a kind of smugness, according to Childs. He quoted 
from Myrdal’s Nobel lecture, receiving the prize in economics in 1975: 
“The Equality Issue in World Development”. Myrdal had given his home 
country a “high remark”, in particular with regard to avoiding giving for-
eign aid “the justification of self-interest”. A “nationalistic motive” could 
never “with any credibility be presented to the Swedish people”, accord-
ing to Myrdal (Childs, 1980, 148–149). A measure of ambivalence on 
Childs’s part was revealed when he established that Vietnam received 
by far the greatest amount of bilateral Swedish aid. But this aspect of 
Sweden’s international role was obviously what impressed Childs most – 
besides her staunch and multifaceted support for the UN. In his view, 
Sweden’s conscience was not about singing with the angels in order to 
release internal steam, as Huntford had claimed:
In its participation in international programs to improve the lot 
of people in Third World countries, Sweden has set a record few 
other nations can match. It has undertaken to keep its contribution 
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to the UN multinational organizations and to bilateral foreign 
aid at 1 percent of the country’s gross national product. It is the 
only country that has attained this level. The United States in 1975 
contributed [0].27 percent of GNP, Switzerland [0].19, Germany 
[0].40. The figure for the Netherlands was [0].75, for Norway [0].66. 
Even when, under the new coalition government, borrowing abroad 
became necessary to meet budgetary deficits, the goal of increasing 
foreign assistance by 25 percent a year was maintained. This meant 
that the total of foreign aid was roughly equivalent to the $2 billion 
borrowed abroad in 1977. Sweden is one of the largest contributors 
to the United Nations Development Program and the United 
Nation [sic] International Children’s Fund. Food aid, tied to various 
international food programs with Swedish contributions in kind, 
amounts to close to $150 million in value. (Childs, 1980, 150)
A feature that also attracted Childs’s sympathies was the Swedish 
stance towards the nuclear arms race. This was mainly embodied by 
Alva Myrdal – who would receive her Nobel Peace Prize two years later. 
Childs delineated her international career, as well as her and her husband 
Gunnar’s links to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI). He referred to her book The Game of Disarmament, from 1976, 
quoting her concerning the paradox of a rational efficiency in the arms 
race alongside a lack of rational criticism of its lunacy. Childs also men-
tioned Alva Myrdal’s part in abolishing the plans to make Swedish nuclear 
arms, which in the late 1950s and early 60s had been fairly advanced. This 
matter was in fact intimately related to a major theme in Childs’s book, 
the intricacies of Swedish politics concerning civil nuclear energy. But the 
fact that Sweden was a relatively large producer of conventional weap-
ons and military technology was a complicating factor in Childs’s take 
on Sweden’s international role, especially as it was an integrated part of 
her neutrality policy. Childs pointed to a paradox. He did so, preparing to 
talk about diplomatic interchanges instigated by Swedish trade with Saab 
fighter aeroplanes, which were partly dependent on American patents:
Much as it likes to stay outside the United States’ quarrels with the 
Soviet Union, Sweden has more than once found itself caught in 
the middle. The supersonic plane, for example, was a remarkable 
achievement for a nation of 8,000,000. In a world bristling with 
armaments, Sweden with its high technology was not to be left out. 
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But in the context of Sweden’s strict neutrality and the government’s 
high-minded criticism of the military and foreign policy of other 
nations the creation of the supersonic fighter plane was bound 
to cause complications. This is part of the paradox of a people 
determined to preserve the values of the past when those values are 
being rapidly eroded away almost everywhere else. (Childs, 1980, 145)
But the balance tipped in Sweden’s favour in Childs’s judgment. At 
the beginning of the chapter on Sweden and the world he had indicated 
this by giving a new meaning to his old catchword, “the middle way”:
In its relations with the rest of the world as much as in its internal 
affairs, Sweden has sought a middle way – neutrality in war, aid to 
those who need it in peacetime. Abroad as well as at home, it has 
been determined to live up to the standards set in arriving at a middle 
way, though preachments on foreign policy by a small power in 
the north of Europe have often sounded self-righteous. Much 
of its policy has been concentrated on the division between the 
industrialized West and the Third World, and with it have gone large 
sums of aid – large for a nation of 8,000,000 people – to try to raise 
standards in developing nations and particularly in agriculture. The 
cornerstone was neutrality, strict and unyielding. (Childs, 1980, 120)
These were remarkably generous words from a person who had spent 
decades as a belligerent enemy of conservative calls for American neu-
trality policies in the spirit of isolationism and anti-federal sentiment. 
As in Childs’s take from 1936, peaceful Sweden was far from any Utopia. 
The reason for paying attention to her case was not a matter of bold vi-
sions. In contrast to Huntford’s and other Swedoclasts’ claims, Sweden 
was, in Childs’s view, still a useful case in point, not least by virtue of 
showing what a responsible citizenship in the international community 
of nations can look like.
Pastoral landscapes for  
foreign battlefields
“The Swedish peace story”, as Hinshaw called it in 1949, is a reveal-
ing strand in Swedological writings from the genre’s golden era. It 
shows how recurring clusters of themes were used for curiously shifting 
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purposes. The topics of long-lasting peace, neutrality and Sweden’s 
role in the world were present and intimately linked to a whole set of 
other themes in all modes of Swedophilia and Swedoclasm, regard-
less of what the motives were behind specific arguments concerning 
Sweden, or what the motives were for taking interest in the small king-
dom on the northern fringe of Europe in the first place. Whether the 
Swedish mode of peaceableness was to be seen as a vice or a virtue, a 
deterrent or a model to follow, was never decided by any realities on 
Swedish soil. It was decided by the ends for which the Swedish case 
was brought out as an example, the ways in which this “case in point” 
was deployed as a weapon on battlefields beyond the Swedish borders. 
Two factors decided the possible ways in which the Swedish case was 
charged with meaning: (1) the topical issues within the debates going 
on in the non-Swedish contexts in which Swedologists intended to 
intervene, and (2) what had been claimed about Sweden in such con-
texts before, the imaginary landscapes the country’s name could be 
expected to conjure up in the readers’ minds. The genre was charac-
terized by its fundamentally polemical nature. A logic of debunkery was 
practised by Swedophiles and Swedoclasts, trying to disclose each oth-
er’s depictions as “the Swedish myth” (a term introduced in Joesten’s 
attack on the “Middle-Way enthusiasts” in 1943). That logic did also 
form the statements of Swedologists who attempted to paint relatively 
nuanced pictures – really taking interest in Swedish realities as such, 
beyond their possible uses as bludgeons elsewhere.
In this way, perceptions of geopolitical matters and security issues 
in Northern Europe became linked to matters such as workplace re-
lationships and sex habits. This was mainly due to the role Sweden at-
tained as a “crystal ball” of industrial and cultural modernity, until her 
economic Cinderella story ended and she became just another modern 
economy among others as from circa 1976. Such perceptions were al-
ways related to interpretations of Scandinavia or the Nordic countries 
as a zone on the map. Often Sweden was treated as the most significant 
or consistent example of phenomena that were basically Scandinavian. 
But in many cases, pointing out differences between Sweden and her 
neighbours, contrasts behind superficial similarities, was a strategy to 
stress that her example was really unique, and thus an instructive “case 
in point”. A measure of schadenfreude in the other Scandinavian coun-
tries in the wake of Huntford’s anathema from 1971 illustrates that, as 
does a late crop of Swedoclastic writings by Nordic authors in the 1980s. 
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Images from the classic era of Swedology linger. It will be interesting to 
see in what ways old takes on the pastoral landscape of Swedish indus-
trial modernity and its place in the world may be reactivated in our time, 
as Sweden’s new role as a multicultural society with a tradition of gen-
erous immigration policies tends to bring her back into the spotlight as 
perhaps a unique case, even among her Nordic neighbours.
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